1536-

CHAL -0331 Copy 7

CHALICE BRIEFING

This paper sets forth information regarding a TOP SECRET activity known as CHALICE. Since its inception, in December 1954, the mission of this program has been considered one of the country's most closely guarded secrets. Accordingly, maximum security has prevailed requiring the highest standard of clearance. A strict "need to know" policy is in force and neither rank, position nor prior clearance is acceptable as an automatic entry to CHALICE information. The activity is a joint Central Intelligence Agency/United States Air Force effort under the direction of CIA and the command center is at CHALICE Project Headquarters, located within the Agency.

CHALICE involves the overflight of the Soviet
Union and Satellites by use of a manned aircraft known
as the U-2 for the purpose of collecting photographic and
electronic intelligence. This vehicle is a single engine
jet which has the capability of maintaining stable flight
for periods up to ten hours at an altitude
The design of this aircraft is credited to the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation who also flight-tested the
first production model within seven months of the date
contracts were negotiated. During the initial production
stages of the U-2, other contracts were negotiated to com-
plete the Reconnaissance System which is carried aboard
the craft. This included the power plant, cameras, elec-
tronic components, optical system and tracking cameras,
film manufacture and processing, sextant, auto-pilot and
nim manufacture and processing, sextens, and processing,
partial pressure flying suit.

25X1D

The state of the s

25X1D

Logistical support to all CHALICE operations, foreign and domestic, is handled by the United States Air Force through the direction of a Special Projects Office established within Headquarters, USAF. Due to the high Presidential priority given to Project CHALICE, all vital support materials are moved expeditiously and in many instances require a special airlift. It must be assumed, however, that requests for support may be levied upon other components of the Armed Forces when deemed necessary.

25X1A	A testing and training site was established for CHALICE	25X1A
20/1/1/	This was	
	a restricted area with access limited to pre-selected air	
	corridors only. All land routes were controlled by	
	Federal Security guards and their use restricted to supply	
	lines only. In order to transport personnel and airlift supplies a daily shuttle was established	25X1A
	through the cooperation of MATS, and a terminal was established at Burbank, California, Airport complete with C-54 cargo passenger aircraft and service crews. All personnel	•
	boarding the shuttle were checked by a Security Officer assigned to operate the terminal. Passengers were also	
051/44	checked against a master clearance list on their arrival	
25X1A		
	Overseas operational facilities have been located	
	in Germany, Turkey and Japan. The first of these bases	
	has presently been reduced to a stand-by staging area from	
	which future short term operations will operate. Personnel	
	assigned to these areas originally assembled as a complete	
	detachment and were transported	25X1A
	as a unit complete with operational equipment to their	
	respective overseas stations.	
25X1A		
23X IA		

In order to expose the operational aircraft (U-2) to the general public in the United States and foreign areas, it was necessary to devise a cover which could legitimately be explained when subjected to question. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics agreed to sponsor the various detachments in the conduct of Upper Atmosphere Research Studies. Since NACA does not have overseas facilities at their disposal, the Air Weather Service/USAF was asked to serve as executive agent supplying base accommodations, personnel and related support. All detachments were thus officially designated as Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons, Provisional, with their original point of establishment being

25X1A

To assist in protecting information related to the U-2, its announced capability was stated to be 55,000 feet with a range of approximately 2,000 miles. Actual Weather Reconnaissance is being conducted at all altitudes and data collected is being prepared into unclassified scientific bulletins for public release. Data collected at altitudes in excess of 55,000 feet is currently restricted under TOP SECRET control and is not included in the scientific bulletins being prepared. In this manner, the cover mechanism utilized actually produces a product that can be legitimately defended if necessary.

25X1A

Security responsibility for Project CHALICE rests with CIA. However, certain responsibilities involving clearance procedures, briefings, debriefings, control of CHALICE materials, et cetera, are delegated to CHALICE Security Officers within specific commands, organizations, and units.

Access to CHALICE information is determined by Phases. These are Phase I - Industrial development and manufacturing; Phase II involves bringing product and suppliers together; Phase III is a full clearance, including sponsor, mission and capabilities; Phase IV concerns use of the finished product, including distribution to the Intelligence community and is governed by a separate security system; and Phase V deals with secondary application of technical achievements to other military and civilian programs.

There are four principle facts which personnel affiliated with CHALICE are obliged to protect. They are:

- (1) That the United States is engaged in a major overflight effort
- (2) That CIA is sponsoring or affiliated with such a program
- (3) That the U-2 has the capability of ten hours sustained flight at altitudes and

(4) That the Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons, Provisional, have a covert intelligence reconnaissance mission.

Security is the responsibility of everyone. Any act or incident which tends to embarrass the CHALICE program, its members, cover organizations, the Agency or the United States will result in severe disciplinary action. The success of the CHALICE program is dependent upon your complete support of security requirements.

25X1D